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Abstract.
Purpose – Mapping of Swedish students’ attitudes toward Snowden’s revelations and their effects in the
political and socio-cultural environment of Sweden.
Design/methodology/approach – A questionnaire was answered by 190 Swedish University students. 
The quantitative responses to the survey were statistically analysed as well as qualitative considerations 
of free text answers.
Findings – Swedish students had a high level of knowledge of Snowden revelations, they actively 
searched for information, they gave a positive judgement of Snowden’s actions and they were willing to 
follow his example in Sweden but not the US. They trusted their country and most of its institutions and 
authorities except for secret service agencies and Internet and computer software companies.
Practical implications – Design of education for university students, especially in Information 
Technology programs.
Social implications – Developing and applying policies on privacy, surveillance and whistleblowing.
Originality/value – This study is part of a bigger international study to map students’ attitudes toward 
Snowden’s revelations and their opinions about privacy, surveillance and whistleblowing opening up for 
cross-cultural analyses.
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1. Introduction
In June 2013, The Guardian in the UK and The Washington Post in the US began publishing internal
electronic  documents from the US’ signals intelligence (SIGINT) organisation the National  Security
Agency (NSA), provided to them by Edward Snowden who had obtained the documents while employed
as  a  systems  administrator  at  the  NSA for  contractor  Booz  Allen  Hamilton.  As  they  have  done
previously, the  NSA and other parts  of  the  US government  generally  will  not  confirm or deny the
validity of the documents, however on 21st June 2013, the US Department of Justice charged Snowden
with violating the Espionage Act. The activities detailed in the documents included activity undertaken
by  the  NSA  and  its  main  SIGINT  partner  the  UK’s  Government  Communications  Headquarters
(GCHQ), and with the SIGINT agencies of three former British colonies (Canada, Australia and New
Zealand),  as  well  as  joint  activities  with  similar  agencies  in  other  countries  such  as  Germany’s
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).
In 2014, the Pew Research Center (Madden, 2014) undertook the first of a number of surveys of US
citizens’ attitudes to Snowden and the documents he revealed. In particular, they asked questions such as
whether respondents believed that Snowden’s revelations had served or harmed the public good, whether
Snowden  should  be  prosecuted  or  not.  Inspired  by  these  surveys,  a  group  of  academics  at  Meiji
University in Tokyo developed a pilot survey deployed in Japan and Spain using students as the primary
research population (for reasons of resource constraints) and conducted follow-up interviews. The results
of this pilot survey are presented in Murata, Adams and Lara Palma (2017). Having revised the survey
after analysis it was deployed with the cooperation of local academics in Mexico, New Zealand, Spain
and Sweden (in English), and in translation in Japan and Germany. With the aid of graduate students
studying in Tokyo, it was also translated into Chinese and deployed in Taiwan (using traditional Chinese
characters) and the People’s Republic of China (using simplified Chinese characters). The choice of
countries  was  a  combination  of  deliberation  and  pragmatism.  The  following  countries  had  suitable
resources available: New Zealand was chosen as a Five Eyes member; Germany, Spain and Sweden
provide  an EU perspective;  Mexico  provides  a  US neighbouring  perspective  as  well  as  a  Spanish-
influenced culture outside Spain; and Japan, China and Taiwan provide a South East Asian viewpoint.
This paper presents the results of the survey in Sweden.
1.1 Roadmap
This paper focusses on the local content of Snowden’s revelations in the rest of this introduction section.
In  Section  2  an  overview  is  given  of  the  general  cultural  and  historical  context  of  government
surveillance. Section 3 gives an overview of the survey and of respondent’s demographic information,
while section 4 provides the detailed survey results. Section 5 presents the political and cultural impacts
of Snowden as perceived by the authors, while the final section gives some conclusions and identifies
avenues for future research.
1.2 Snowden’s Revelations and Sweden
People in Sweden have a high level of knowledge about new technology as well as a strong conviction
about  their  society being  supportive  of  individual  rights  and  freedom.  A combination  of  these  two
generates a strong interest in issues of the relationship of technology, society and human life, especially
among younger people in the country. Sweden is one of the oldest countries in Europe with strong
traditions  and  a  rather  homogenous  culture.  Snowden’s  whistleblowing  and  revelations  have  been
perceived  rather  positively on  an  ideological  and  moral  level.  He was  awarded  the  Swedish  Right
Livelihood Award 2014, which is described as an alternative Nobel Prize, with the description: “... for
his  courage  and  skill  in  revealing  the  unprecedented  extent  of  state  surveillance  violating  basic
democratic processes and constitutional rights.” (Right Livelihood Award, 2014). This general positive
attitude did not, however, lead to any concrete political action, for example, the granting of political
asylum. Snowden was not even able to visit Sweden and attend the prize award ceremony in person.
This is illustrative of something of a double standard in Sweden regarding individual rights: on the one
hand a high profile and outspoken supporter of freedom; on the other hand a country with a long history
of surveillance in the service of preserving its ideological and political homogeny.
2. Background: Historical Surveillance in Sweden
Systematic surveillance in Sweden started in the 19th century by the government to handle certain risks
connected to the rising labour movement and to a growing number of foreign citizens entering and living
in the country. However, this surveillance organization soon sought and gained more independence from
its principal, the government of the day, promoting its own importance and necessity (Langkjaer, 2011).
Later on, the Bolshevik power taking in Russia and the establishment of fascist and Nazi regimes in
several European countries acquired many sympathizers in Sweden which had to be under surveillance.
Even after the Second World War until today there are plenty of reasons for the government to continue
with the surveillance activities, like the spread of Communism in the fifties, radical political movements
in the sixties and seventies, left-wing terrorism in the seventies, right wing extremism later, and now
Islamist terror (Eliasson, 2006).
This has been easily accepted and integrated into normal life in Sweden although it wants to see itself as
a progressive and open society. Probably the reason is that this was not anything new from the start.
Sweden  is,  and  in  the  19th  century  it  was  even  more,  a  Lutheran  society  in  which  the  detailed
surveillance of individual life was seen as something normal. The priests of the church kept track of the
behaviour and the thoughts of their parish members by regular catechetical meetings in their homes. On
the societal level no other beliefs or even Christian churches were allowed, with some few exceptions
like Judaism (Kent, 2008). 
Regarding  surveillance,  Sweden  has  had  for  decades  a  close  cooperation  with  American  security
agencies, despite being a neutral country. Sweden locates in a geo-strategically important position to
access  data  traffic  in  the  Baltic  Sea,  which  has  been  very important  since  the  1940s.  Sweden was
supported by US military technology and received far-reaching security guarantees in the 1960s (Agrell,
2000, 2013). In the documents revealed by Snowden, Sweden is “one of the countries that’s the closest
to  the  US  when  it  comes  to  surveillance”  (The  Local  Sweden,  2013).  This  cooperation  has  been
expanded significantly over the past  five years.   The common operations are  about surveillance on
Russian military and other activities of interest, but there is also cooperation on surveilling the Internet
and other civilian communications (Reuters, 2013; Shilton, 2013). 
Surveillance and control of citizens is the one side of the coin. The other side is the individuals’ trust in
society and state. Although trust in society and government have been declining globally in recent years,
Swedish people still strongly believe their country is trustworthy (Holmberg, 1999; OECD, 2013). In
Sweden people perceive the state as a kind of parent figure and they expect intervention in order to
resolve important issues and to support them in various ways. Therefore surveillance can be tolerated, if
not fully accepted. Since community is understood as something principal or at least superior to the
individual, collectivism as ideology and political correctness play an important role in supporting the
community and keeping together the group, which benefits the individuals. 
Egalitarianism, homogeneity and collectivism are salient features of the Swedish society, with a long
tradition. The individual is loyal to the group. It may be that the cold climate or the harsh conditions of
the Nordic country made the group so important. Anyway, diverging ideas or behavior by an individual
risk the cohesion or the actions of the group and threaten the well-being of its members, therefore they
cannot be tolerated (Daun, 1996).
Political correctness has its roots in Lutheran tradition but it is still dominating Swedish society today. It
is important to keep in mind that political correctness refers to whatever for the moment is established as
the right thing, morally, ideologically or politically.
Homogeneity and political correctness make it very difficult for dissent voices to be uttered or to be
listened to. Anyone who dares to utter anything provocative to the established order may be treated as a
disloyal,  a  traitor  or  even  as  a  lunatic.  Still  Sweden  has  passed  a  law  making  it  compulsory  for
government private employees to report to the media irregularities, wrongdoings and bad conditions in
their  working  place.  Furthermore,  the  law  protects  the  whistleblower  and  makes  it  illegal  for  the
government to search for the leak (Regeringskansliet, 2014; Transparency International, 2012).
2.1 Individual rights
Despite the fact Sweden being a homogeneous society, individualism and a strong feeling of privacy
have also a long tradition in Sweden. Sweden is a big country with a small population. Today more
people live in the cities, previously the great majority lived in farms spread all over the huge country,
often in a relatively long distance from each other and isolated by forests. This situation became the
ground  for  a  feeling  of  independence  and  uneasiness  of  interference  by  any  outsider,  particularly
governmental or religious authorities.
Double standards and hypocrisy, related to the individual’s façade vis-à-vis official positions, is very
common in Sweden. This works as the other side of homogeneity and Lutheranism. Double standards
and hypocrisy are very useful in a society where the cohesion of a group is very important. They become
the defense and the protection of the individual’s privacy and the individual’s choices and behavior,
whenever  they  do  not  comply  with  the  moral,  ideological  and  political  correctness  of  society.  By
adopting hypocrisy the individual can be free to act as he finds best without the risk of threatening the
cohesion of the group or the risk of being seen as disloyal or traitor.
Sweden is a country where workers’ movement and unionism started early and became very successful
and  strong.  This  movement  questioned  traditional  values  and  promoted  new  ideas.  Openness,
democracy, free speech, individual freedoms and rights played a central role in the ideology of labor
unions and of Social-democratic party, who governed Sweden for half a century. These new ideas helped
to build the workers’ unions and party, and eventually became themselves an established institution
dominating political ideology in Sweden (Haug, 2004).
Starting from this ideological base at home, Sweden has been very influential in the work to spread these
ideas internationally. It took the role of promoting individual rights and freedom. Sweden acquired a
high profile as the moral conscience of the world directed not only outside but also inside the country.
Swedes perceive their country as the most open, tolerant and respectful of individual rights (Joenniemi,
2013).
Sweden is also a high technological country. New and advanced information technologies are developed
at universities and in industry, and they are used in almost every aspect of working or private life. One
telling example is the broad use of cards for payment which is highest in Europe (Economist, 2016), and
the use of electronic on-line medical records easily accessed by doctors and patients. The government
and the people support this technological excellency, and they are proud of it. Focus on information
technology and its importance, discussing freely and intensively all ideas connecting to the use of IT, and
the culture built around it lead in a high awareness of Swedes regarding IT’s effect on individual rights,
both positive and negative (Lehnbom, McLachlan & Brien, 2013).
2.2 Individuals and society
All this affects  the thoughts of  Swedish people believing that they live probably in the most open,
democratic and tolerant society of the world, where individual rights are of outmost importance and
therefore they are  supported fully by the government and society. And this  strong belief  dominates
people’s minds in a collectivistic, invariable and rather uniform society, which has great difficulties to
handle ideas contesting political correctness, and which has a long tradition and culture of control and
surveillance.
These  two  opposing  traditions  of  Swedish  society  have  led  to  contradicting  policies:  Sometimes
supporting  privacy and whistleblowing, sometimes  imposing control  and surveillance.  For  example,
Sweden offers a strong protection for whistleblowers, which will  soon be even stronger; people can
access all unclassified government data anonymously; there is an influential movement for individual
rights; and Swedes have a culture of openness and respect for the individual. But on the other hand we
have many scandals spoiling this nice picture of individual rights: FRA conflict and later accusations of
cooperating with NSA; earlier the IB affair about spying on leftist workers union members by the Social-
democratic party; the Bofors and Tsesis scandals about punishing whistleblowers; recently the Roma
registration scandal about the police registering persons illegally; and many more (Hedin & Månsson,
2012).
2.3 Summary
According  to  all  the  above,  students  in  Sweden,  especially  university  students  of  Information
Technology are expected to show a strong feeling for privacy and for whistleblowing combined with
trust  to  their  society.  They  are  involved  in  IT,  they  are  either  active  themselves  into  the  privacy
movement or they have a very good interest and knowledge about these issues, and they support actions
protecting privacy like whistleblowing. Older students who have more experience in these activities
have a better understanding of the right to privacy. However, students in Sweden are expected to have an
idealistic picture of Sweden, and to accept its profile at face value, including the official presentation of
the country as solidly supporting privacy and whistleblowing.
3. Overview of the Survey
The survey consists of 40 questions (in English) with a variety of answers forms including yes/no; Likert
scales and free text responses (which could be given in English or Swedish). It is part of an international
comparative study using the same questions except for some very minor local alterations such as the
names of a country’s law enforcement and secret intelligence service organisations, and in some cases
traanslation of the questions and answer options.
Participants were recruited from undergraduate and graduate (Master and PhD) students who had studied
an IT and Ethics course at Uppsala University during the previous two years. They were invited to
participate in the online survey by e-mail. Participation was entirely voluntary and not compensated.
Respondents participated between 5th October and 11th November 2014.
The total number of respondents was 190 (male 142, female 47 and other 1), with 46 “25+ years old",
6% teenagers  (18-19).  Most  (173;  91%)  were  studying  at  Uppsala  University,  15  (8%)  at  another
Swedish university and 2 (1%) at universities outside Sweden. Two thirds (126; 66%) were studying
technology/engineering  and  another  27  (14%)  were  studying  natural/physical  sciences.  Respondents
were  mostly  Swedish  (149;  78%)  with  two  a  mix  of  Swedish  and  non-Swedish  descent.  Others
nationalities  represented  included  other  European  countries,  African  countries,  Asian  Countries  and
North American Countries.
Table 1: Respondent attributes (N=190)
Gender
Male Female Other
142 (75%) 47 (25%) 1 (1%)
Age
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25+
2 10 10 16 22 19 24 87
The platform of the questionnaire was the free online survey software SurveyMonkey. All responses
have been stored in a common data base from which they could be retrieved and analyzed. No follow-up
interviews were conducted.
3.1 Analytical Approaches
Much of the data from the surveys consists of Likert Scale responses, usually on a four option scale. For
all such questions, respondents could skip any question they did not wish to answer, either giving an
explicit “I do not wish to answer this question” response, or by simply not selecting an answer. For those
questions requesting an evaluation or opinion in response, a “no opinion” box was also shown separately
(to the right hand side of the “opinion-exposing” answers to avoid the well-known problem of median
answers). The answers varied depending on the question, including zero-to-positive indications from
“none” to “a lot” or negative/positive evaluations “disagree a lot” through to “agree a lot”.
These  Likert  scale  responses  are  then  analysed  using  continuous  statistical  approaches  to  answer
questions about their relationship to respondents' attributes or other answers. While not a universally
accepted approach (Kuzon  et al., 1996) it is quite common and if done appropriately is accepted by
many as  a  robust  approach  (Labowitz,  1967;  Norman,  2010).  In  particular  the  use  of  Likert  scale
responses in this paper are primarily used for explanatory purposes and to show relationships between
attributes/responses, and are not used as numerical input data for further analyses.
The  following  abbreviations  for  statistical  terms  are  used  in  presenting  quantitative  analyses:  SD:
Standard Deviation; M: Mean; SE: Standard Error; D: (average) Difference; CI: Confidence Interval; t:
t-test result.
4. Survey Results and Discussions
4.1 Attitudes to Privacy
The  vast  majority  (177;  93%)  of  respondents  felt  that  the  right  to  privacy  is  “Very  important”  or
“Important”, with only ten responding that it is “Not so important”, and none  that it is “Not important at
all”(three preferred not to answer). When asked how well they understood the right to privacy, most
(139; 73%) indicated that they understood it (“Understand very well”/“Understand”) while 39 (21%)
indicated that they did not understand (“Hardly understand”/“Don’t understand at all”) and 12 preferred
not to answer (see Table 2 for detailed breakdowns)
Table 2: Frequency table of Q11 and Q14
Q11. Is your right to privacy important? Q14 How well do you understand what the rightto privacy is?
Answers Frequency (%) Answers Frequency (%)
Very important 108 (57%) Understand very well 41 (22%)
Important 69 (36%) Understand 98 (52%)
Not so important 10 (5%) Hardly understand 37 (19%)
Not important at all 0 (0%) Don’t understand at all 2 (1%)
Total 187 Total 178
Collapsing  these  answers  into  “Important”/“Not  important”  and  “Understand”/“Not  Understand”
produces the Contingency table shown in Table 3, in which can be seen that 34 respondents regard the
right to privacy as important even though they do not understand it. Despite this, a Fisher Exact test
shows a significant correlation at the 5% level between valuation of importance and understanding of the
right to privacy (Fisher Test statistic: 0.042, p<0.05).
Table 3: Contingency table of Q11 and Q14
Q 14 How well do you understand what the right to privacy is?
“Understand very well”
or “Understand”
“Hardly understand” or 
“Don’t understand at all” Total
Q 11 Is 
your right 
to privacy 
important?
“Very important” or 
“Important” 134 34 168
“Not so important” or
“Not important at all” 5 5 10
Total 139 39 178
Respondents were asked to give free text answers explaining why the right to privacy is important or
not. The three who felt that the right was not important, all gave answers indicating that they had nothing
to  hide  (two  said  this  only  while  one  indicated  a  possible  problem with  “insurance  companies  or
organizations  that  go  against  my  personal  beliefs  and  opinions”).  Of  the  two  who  felt  that  they
understood the right but felt that it was not important, one answered that they had nothing to hide, and
the other that too much privacy could make society feel cold . This second answer was echoed by one of
those who felt that they hardly understood the right, but that it wasn’t important, using the phrase from
Egger’s novel “The Circle” that “Sharing is Caring. Two others again indicated nothing to hide, another
that privacy was impossible with modern technology, and the final one gave no answer.
Amongst thoe who felt that the right was (very) important a number of key themes emerged from their
free-text answers (some gave more than one of these answers). The most common element was that
privacy is a fundamental right indicated by 43 respondents. The right to a personal life was mentioned by
35. Control/consent over  the  collection,  processing and use of  personal  information  came up in  30
answers.  Personal  security/safety  was  an  element  in  23  answers,  while  22  included  concern  about
misuse.  The  necessity  of  privacy  for  wellbeing  appeared  in  11 answers,  while  nine  mentioned  the
importance of privacy for democracy.
Respondents were asked whether their Internet and their non-Internet activities involve taking risks with
their privacy. Internet activities were seen as a greater risk. Internet involves taking risks with privacy:
strongly  (53/190;  28%)  or  to  an  extent  (95/190;  50%)  together  almost  78%,  whereas  non-Internet
activities involves taking risks with privacy: strongly (7/190; 4%) or to an extent (60/190; 32%) together
only just over a third (35%).
Figure 1: Do you feel that you are taking risks with your privacy? (N=190)
These results show that respondents are generally concerned about their privacy online and generally not
concerned about their privacy offline.  The mode for the privacy risks of Internet  activity is “To an
extent” but for Non-Internet activity is “No much” Using a two-tailed paired means t-test analysis with a
numeric interpretation (0: “Not at all”; 1: “Not much”; 2: “To an extent”; 3: “Strongly”), respondents
were more concerned about their privacy in Internet activity than non-Internet activity, significant at the
1% level:  (t=-12.813; p< 0.00001).
This is borne out again when they were asked about the level of privacy threat posed by various groups
and technologies. Respondents were asked to rate the level of threat to their privacy posed by 15 groups
and 19 technologies on levels of  “Not at all”; “Not Much”; “To an Extent”; “Strongly”. Allocating
numeric values to these of 0 (Not at all)  to 3 (Strongly),  allows calculation of a mean privacy risk
associated with each item, and the production of a ranked list of each. These are shown in Tables 4
(groups) and 5 (technologies). The mean value for all group is 1.43 (with a SD of 1.011) and for all
technologies  is  1.5  (with  a  SD of  1.017).  Since  the  mid-point  of  the  scale  is  1.5  this  shows  that
respondents  were  concerned  about  many groups  and technologies,  but  unconcerned  about  others  (a
standard deviation of approximately 1 around an average of the mid-point).
Internet companies were clearly seen as the most dangerous type of organisation, with a mean of 2.44:
106 respondents regarded them as a strong threat to their privacy and another 33 as a threat to an extent.
Secret  Service  government  agencies,  telecom  companies,  other  for-profit  companies  and  computer
software companies were all also regarded as threats with a mean of more than 1.75. Law enforcement
government agencies had a mean just above the mid-point of 1.5, while Systems integrators and other
government agencies were just below that mid-point, computer hardware companies were down in the
less risky area. All groups of individuals were in the low risk zone, with the more well-known, the lower
the risk. Health-care and other non-profit organisations were also low risk (average of below 1) while
educational institutions were tied with well-known individuals at the lowest risk.
Smartphones and social media services were regarded as the most risky technologies, the only ones with
an average of above 2. 86 respondents regarded smartphones as a strong threat and 69 as a threat to an
extent,while 80 regarded social media as a strong threat and 64 as a threat to an extent. Behavioural
targetting and online shopping were regarded as moderate threats. RFID, home-based health monitoring,
personal body monitoring, home automation and video consoles were all regarded as low risks.
Table 4: Ranked means (0: low; 3: high) of 15 groups as perceived privacy threat
Q8. How much do you feel that the following groups threaten your privacy?
Types of organisations Mean SD
Internet companies 2.44 0.722
Secret service government agencies 2.11 1.036
Telecom companies/ Internet providers 1.95 0.799
Other for-profit companies 1.82 0.865
Computer software companies 1.79 0.945
Law enforcement government agencies 1.59 1.039
System Integrators 1.47 0.873
Other government agencies 1.38 0.947
Computer hardware companies 1.21 0.905
Individuals who you don't know 1.10 0.879
Individuals who you know but not well 1.04 0.817
Health-care organisations 0.93 0.861
Other not-for-profit organisations 0.91 0.783
Individuals who you know well 0.81 0.869
Educational institutions 0.81 0.745
Table 5: Ranked means (0: low; 3: high) of 19 technologies as perceived privacy threat
Q9. How much do you feel that the following technologies threaten your privacy?
Technologies Mean SD
Smart phone 2.23 0.844
Social media services 2.19 0.881
Behavioural targeting 1.94 0.990
Online shopping 1.81 0.898
Personal computer 1.75 0.914
GPS 1.71 0.948
Making payments online 1.63 0.885
CCTV 1.56 0.971
Online auction 1.42 0.948
Smart meter 1.41 0.994
Smart card 1.36 0.976
Online games 1.27 0.939
RFID 1.23 1.006
Home-based health monitoring 1.12 0.997
Personal body monitoring 1.11 0.964
Home video game console 1.01 0.876
Home automation which senses human activities 0.90 0.931
Portable video game console 0.80 0.854
4.2 Knowledge of Surveillance
Respondents were asked to assess their level of knowledge of Swedish organisations involved in Signals
intelligence (SIGINT) as well as the US and UK organisations. They were asked
Do you know much about the following organisations?
• FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)
• CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)
• NSA (National Security Agency)
• GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters)
• Säpo (Säkerhetspolisen)
• FRA (Försvarets radioanstalt)
• MUST (Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten)
• Datainspektionen
with answer options of “I have heard of this organisation and understand what it does”; “I have heard of
this organisation but do not understand what it does”; “I have not heard of this organisation”; “I prefer
not to answer this question”.
As can be seen from figure 2, most respondents know about the three US agencies (FBI, CIA and NSA),
with fewer, but still a majority knowing the Swedish groups Säpo and FRA. Swedish groups MUST and
Datainspektionen are  little  known and most  have not  even heard of the UK’s GCHQ and very few
believe they understand what it does.
Figure 2: Knowledge of  Agencies
Almost all respondents had heard about Snowden’s revelations: 94% (179/190). Their reported level of
knowledge was mixed, with around half  (52%, 93/179) claiming to know “A lot” or “A fair amount”
about  the  revelations,  with  the  other  half  knowing  “Not  much”  or  “Little”  (three  preferred  not  to
answer). The US government’s reactions were a little better known (perhaps reflecting the amount of
information available as much as interest in the topic) with 65% (116 of 179) claiming to know “A lot”
(15) or “A fair amount” (101),  but only just over a third (39%; 70/179) were well-informed on the
current status of Mr Snowden. See Table 6 for a detailed breakdown. 
Table 6: Level of Knowledge of Snowden’s Revelations
Q.24. How much do you know about the contents of Snowden's revelations?
Q.26. How much do you know about the US government’s reactions to Snowden’s revelations?
Q.27. How much do you know about the current status of Mr. Snowden?
Q24 Q26 Q27
A lot 15 8% 15 8% 7 4%
A fair amount 78 41% 101 53% 63 33%
Not much 67 35% 40 21% 78 41%
Little 16 8% 20 11% 28 15%
Nothing/No Ans 14 7% 14 7% 14 7%
The main channels of information (Q21: How did you get and have updated your knowledge about
Snowden's revelations? (Multiple answers allowed)) were reading news reports on the Internet (150;
84%,), reading newspaper articles (113; 63%), social media (103; 58%) and watching TV news reports
(97; 54%). Just under half had heard about them from friends or acquaintances (81; 45%). Hearing about
Snowden during lectures at university did not play any important role (6; 3%).As might be expected
given that almost half had heard about the revelations from friends or acquaintances,  71% (127/179)
reporting  having  talked  about  them  with  others.  Only  half  (89/179;  50%)  reported  searching  for
information about the revelations.  A fisher exact test on the contingency table showed a correlation
between those who had discussed the revelations and those who had searched, significant at the 1% level
(two-tailed p: 0.006 < 0.01)
Table 7: Contingency Table for Discussed/Searched Snowden’s revelations
Discussed?
Searched? Yes No Total
Yes 72 16 88
No 53 32 85
Total 125 48 173
4.3. Evaluation of Snowden’s Actions
Respondents in this survey were very positive about Snowden’s actions. After being presented with a
brief  neutral  description  of  Snowden’s  revelation  all  respondents  (including  those  who  had  not
previously heard about his actions) were asked “Did Snowden's revelations serve or harm the public
interest?” seven had no opinion. 162 of those who offered an opinion  gave a positive evaluation: 86
selecting “Served it a lot” and 76 “To some extent”. Six felt that he had “Harmed it to an extent” and
one that he had “Harmed it a lot”. Unsurprisingly, given this positive evaluation of his actions, 121
respondents thought that the US should not pursue a criminal case against him, while only 17 thought
that they should (39 had no opinion and 13 chose not to answer).
Respondents were then asked two hypothetical questions about whether they would follow Snowden’s
lead and emulate his actions. They were asked whether they would act as he did if they were US citizens
and found out the same information that he had (QUS), and they were also asked about whether they
would do the same had they found out about a similar situation in Sweden (and were Swedish citizens –
remember that  approximately one in six participants were not Swedish, comprised of 30 nationalities)
(QSE). Table 8 shows the contingency table for answers to QUS and QSE.
Table 8: Would you Follow Snowden?
QUS
Yes No N/A Total
QSE
Yes 56 21 13 90
No 2 40 2 44
N/A 4 8 44 56
Total 62 69 59 190
Of those who gave an answer a clear majority (Yes: 90 v 44: No) would emulate Snowden in Sweden
while a smaller majority (Yes: 62 v 69: No) would not emulate him in the US (statistically significant at
the 1% level according to a z-test (z: 53.260, 95% CI [38.52; 56.21]; p<0.0001). Of those who expressed
an answer for both hypotheticals (119 respondents) most were consistent Yes/Yes: 56  and No/No: 40
between emulating him in both or emulating him in neither country. 21 would emulate him in Sweden,
but not the US, while just two would emulate him in the US but not in Sweden. A two-tailed Fisher exact
test shows a correlation significant at the 1% level between the answers to QUS and QSE (p< 1e-12)
Respondents were asked to explain the reasons for their choices. All 21 of those who would follow
Snowden’s lead in Sweden but not the US  gave free text answers for their unwillingness to follow
Snowden’s lead in QUS and for their willingness to follow him in QSE. In explaining their reasons for
not emulating him in the US hypothetical all but one said that they would be too afraid of reprisals from
the government. The other said “If I was an American citizen I would probably be brainwashed about the
importance of collecting information on people to prevent 9/11-like attacks against the Nation.” All the
response as to why they would emulate Snowden in Sweden indicted less fear of reprisals, many stating
their greater faith in the Swedish protection of whistleblowers and fairness of the Swedish courts.
29 of the 44 respondents who would not emulate Snowden in QUS or QSE gave positive evaluations of
Snowden’s effect on the public interest. In their free-text responses explaining their unwillingness to
emulate Snowden, 20 were too afraid of reprisals from both the US and Swedish governments, although
a few said that they were less frightened in the Swedish hypothetical. Three said they did not know why,
two said that they felt it would have no impact, while three said that it would be wrong to do so because
of loyalty to the state or the organisation even though they had answered that Snowden’s revelations had
helped the public good.
4.4. Perceptions of The Impact of Snowden’s Revelations
The 179 who had heard about Snowden’s revelations were asked if they had changed their own online
behaviour afterwards. 71 (40%) said that they had made no change. Seven preferred not to answer. The
remaining 101 selected one or more changes, shown in Table 9 with percentages of both the 101 who
had made changes and the 179 who answered the question. A free-text option for “other changes” was
also provided, through which four mentioned VPNs/Tor/Encryption. 
Table 9: Changes in Behaviours in Response to Snowden’s Revelations
N=101/179; multiple selections permitted
Action No. % of 101 % of 179
Think more about postings on SNS 68 67% 38%
Reduced the use of some services 61 60% 34%
Change privacy settings on some systems 56 55% 31%
Deleted personal data and content from SNS 41 41% 23%
Stopped using some systems 26 26% 15%
All respondents were asked whether they believed Snowden’s revelations had had any broader social
impact. Just over a fifth (40/190; 21%) said they believed no social changes had occurred. A further 52
(27%) had no opinion, while 13 (7%) preferred not to answer. The 85 (45%) who believed that some
social  change  had  happened  were  asked  to  provide  a  free  text  response  about  those  changes.  56
respondents mentioned that Snowden’s revelation had increased awareness of privacy and surveillance
issues. Only 18 felt that people had done something about it by changing their behaviour online. Two
mentioned a general decrease in trust in governments.
When asked whether Swedish citizens need to give up their privacy and freedom in order to ensure the
security of society and the individual, 6 selected “no opinion” and 8 preferred not to answer. Of the 176
expressing an opinion there was a preponderance (65%; 115/176) against agreeing with the statement,
statistically significant at the 1% level according to a z-test (z: 85.787, 95% CI [57.81; 72.34]; p<0.0001)
but a qualified rather than wholehearted rejection, with 49% (86/176) selecting “Not much” and 16%
(29/176) selecting “Not at all”. See Table 10 for the detailed results.
Table 10: Give up Privacy and Freedom for Societal and Individual Security?
Answer Number %
Yes: Very much 8 5%
Yes: To an extent 53 30%
Yes (combined) 61 35%
No (combined) 115 65%
No: Not much 86 49%
No: Not at all 29 16%
4.5. Calculations of The Impact of Snowden’s Revelations
In addition to the perceptions of those who had heard about Snowden’s revelations on their personal
activities or more broadly, differences in attitudes between those who had heard of them (the “Heard”
group) and those who had not (the “Not Heard” group) were analysed to identify significant differences.
Of  course,  any such  significant  difference  is  simply correlation  and  not  necessarily  causation.  it  is
possible that those who are more privacy conscious, for example, might well be more aware of news
reports on surveillance and therefore have heard of Snowden. Nevertheless, these correlations are worth
exploring.
So, did the Heard group demonstrate  a higher level  of  concern about the privacy risks involved in
Internet/non-Internet activity, or regarding the right to privacy? Table 11 shows the contingency tables
for these correlations, along with the results in each case of a Fisher Exact test for correlation. The scales
for importance have been collapsed to binary rather than four-way selections.
Table 11: Contingency Tables for Q7/8/11 and Q20
Q20. Heard about Snowden’s revelations
Q7. Privacy Risk from Internet Activity? Yes No All
Strongly or to an extent 141 7 148
Not much or not at all 38 4 42
All 179 11 190
A Fisher exact one-tailed test fails to show a correlation between Heard Group and Evaluation of 
Privacy threat from Internet Activity at 1% level (p=0.205).
Q20. Heard about Snowden’s revelations
Q8. Privacy Risk from non-Internet Activity? Yes No All
Strongly or to an extent 66 1 67
Not much or not at all 113 10 123
All 179 11 190
A Fisher exact one-tailed test fails to show a correlation between Heard Group and Evaluation of 
Privacy threat from Internet Activity at 1% level (p=0.053).
Q20. Heard about Snowden’s revelations
Q11. Is your right to privacy important? Yes No All
Strongly or to an extent 167 10 177
Not much or not at all 9 1 10
All 176 11 187
A Fisher exact one-tailed test fails to show a correlation between Heard Group and Importance of
the right to Privacy at 1% level (p=0.463).
This suggests that the Heard group are no more generally privacy-conscious than the Not Heard group.
Given  this,  then  analysis  of  other  differences  between  the  groups  with  respect  to  privacy  attitudes
suggest  a  possible  causative  link  between  attitudes  and  Snowden’s  revelations.  Since  Snowden’s
revelation  were  mostly  about  government  surveillance,  but  also  implicated  some  online  services,
Heard/not Heard respondents’ evaluations of the privacy threats posed by Telecom companies (Q9d),
Internet companies (Q9e), Law enforcement government agencies (Q9m), Secret Service Government
Agencies (Q9n) and social media services (Q10n) are compared in Table 12. Because five comparisons
are being calculated, a 1% significance level has been chosen.
Table 12: Contingency Tables for Q9x and Q20
Privacy threat from... Heard about Snowden’s revelations (Q20)
 Q9d. Telecom companies/ Internet providers Yes No All
Strongly or to an extent 134 6 140
Not much or not at all 44 5 49
All 178 11 189
A Fisher exact one-tailed test fails to show any correlation between the Heard/not Heard group 
and the perceived level of privacy threat from Telecom companies/Internet providers at 1% 
level (p=0.123).
 Q9e. Internet companies Yes No All
Strongly or to an extent 159 10 169
Not much or not at all 19 1 20
All 178 11 189
A Fisher exact one-tailed test fails to show any correlation between the Heard/not Heard group 
and the perceived level of privacy threat from Internet companies at 1% level (p=0.67).
 Q9m. Law enforcement government agencies Yes No All
Strongly or to an extent 95 1 96
Not much or not at all 74 9 83
All 169 10 189
A Fisher exact on-tailed test shows a correlation between the Heard Group and the perceived 
level of privacy threat from Law enforcement government agencies at the 1% level (p=0.005).
 Q9n. Secret service government agencies Yes No All
Strongly or to an extent 121 3 124
Not much or not at all 47 5 52
All 168 8 176
A Fisher exact one-tailed test fails to show any correlation between the Heard/not Heard group 
and the perceived level of privacy threat from Secret service government agencies  at 1% level 
(p=0.050).
 Q10n. Social media services Yes No All
Strongly or to an extent 139 5 144
Not much or not at all 31 5 36
All 170 10 180
A Fisher exact on-tailed test shows a correlation between the Heard Group and the perceived 
level of privacy threat from social media services  at the 1% level (p=0.029).
So, the only group which the Heard Group have a statistical correlation with higher privacy threat levels 
are law enforcement government agencies.
Only those who already knew about Snowden’s revelations were asked about whether they had changed 
their behaviour because of it. Did the self-reported level of knowledge of Snowden’s revelations 
correlate with self-reported change of behaviour?
Table 13: Contingency Table for Q24 and Q25 Changed Behaviour (Q25)
Level of Knowledge (Q24) Yes No All
A lot 13 2 15
A fair amount 51 27 78
A lot or A fair amount 64 29 93
Not much or Little 41 42 83
Not much 35 32 67
Little 6 10 16
All 105 71 176
A one-tailed Fisher exact test on the collapsed answers to Q24 shows a correlation at the 1% level 
between level of knowledge and likelihood of changing behaviour (p<0.007)
5. Surveillance in Sweden Following Snowden
Sweden has a strong legal support for whistleblowers, first introduced in the 1949 law on freedom of
the Press, updated in 2014 (Regeringskansliet, 2014). Whistleblowers have the same rights whether they
are employees of government authorities or private organisations, including the right to anonymity, and
immunity from prosecution. This immunity holds even for revealing classified data unless a case of
treason  can  be  made,  or  if  the  revelation  constituted  a  breach  of  medical  or  priestly  confessional
confidentiality. Following Snowden’s revelations, in 2016 the Swedish parliament improved protection
for whistleblowers (Riksdagen, 2015). The new law, which came into force on 1st of January 2017,
forbids employers in both the private and public sectors from retaliating against whistleblowers. If they
do so, the employer is liable for compensation to the whistleblower for economic losses and for the
insult.
However,  existing  government  surveillance  policies  and  practices  have  not  changed in  Sweden
following  Snowden’s  revelations:  the  surveillance  activities  described  above  continue  operating  as
before. 
6. Conclusions
Our hypothesis was that university students of Information Technology in Sweden would be very
conscious about the value of privacy, they would appreciate the practice of whistleblowing. Furthermore,
it  was expected that  Swedish students would trust  their society regarding privacy issues and would
perceive it as supportive of whistleblowing. Swedish society sees itself as respectful to privacy, sensitive
to the Snowden case and therefore ready to strengthen its human rights and openness profile. 
The great majority of the participants reported that they understand both the importance and the
meaning of the right to privacy. Information technology plays an important role for privacy according to
the participants. Use of the Internet was seen as involving risks to privacy whereas other activities were
seen as less risky. This was consistent with their view of the threats to privacy which were felt to come
mainly from Internet, private telecom and computer software companies and from government secret
service agencies.
The level of knowledge of students at Swedish universities about the Snowden case was very high.
Almost all participants reported that they had heard about Snowden’s revelations. The main sources of
information were online and traditional media as well as friends. Furthermore, the participants reported
that they discussed Snowden’s revelations with their friends or other people and many of them searched
actively for  information  about  this  case.  These  findings  support  our  expectations  about  students  at
Swedish universities having a high level of knowledge and interest about Snowden’s actions.
Respondents showed a positive attitude to Snowden’s revelations since they were seen as serving the
public interest,  and believed that some social changes had been caused, mainly higher awareness of
surveillance and caution regarding online activity. The fact  that  Sweden strengthened whistleblower
protection in recent years indicates that this support for Snowden’s actions has broad social support in
Sweden beyond the limited group participating in this survey.
Students  at  Swedish  universities  trust  their  society.  Those  who  had  heard  about  Snowden’s
revelations did not display any significantly higher concern about the privacy risks involved in using the
Internet. They felt that Swedish individuals do not need to give up privacy and freedom in order to
ensure safety and security.
However, those  respondents  who knew more  about  Snowden’s revelations  were  more  likely to
report having changed their online behaviour. Although this is a correlation and not causation it means
there is some distrust, perhaps particularly of foreign companies and agencies such as the NSA.
The idea of following Snowden’s example was clearly more attractive to the participants if they
were placing themselves as Swedes or living in Sweden compared with placing themselves as American
citizens. This means participants trust Sweden more than United States. This conclusion is reinforced by
the correlation between willingness to emulate Snowden in both or neither case. The free text responses
about why they would or would no emulate Snowden support these conclusions strongly, with most
referring to risk to their lifestyles as the main reason for emulation or not.
To summarize, the results support our initial hypotheses that Swedish students had a high knowledge
of  the  Snowden  case,  they  actively  searched  for  information,  they  gave  a  positive  judgment  of
Snowden’s actions and a majority would be willing to follow his example, at least in Sweden. They also
trusted their country and most of its institutions and authorities except for secret service agencies and
telecommunications  companies.  They  also  distrust  Internet  companies,  many  of  which  are  based
overseas, and particularly in the US (such as Facebook and Google).
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